Non-standard Choice in Matching Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. pin down necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' behavior for existence stable incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply well-functioning markets be designed to adequately a plethora behaviors, including standard is consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate significance our in practice, we show simple modification commonly used mechanism enables it
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288333