Non-Profiled Deep Learning-based Side-Channel attacks with Sensitivity Analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How to Compare Profiled Side-Channel Attacks?
Side-channel attacks are an important class of attacks against cryptographic devices and profiled side-channel attacks are the most powerful type of side-channel attacks. In this scenario, an adversary first uses a device under his control in order to build a good leakage model. Then, he takes advantage of this leakage model to exploit the actual leakages of a similar target device and perform ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2569-2925
DOI: 10.46586/tches.v2019.i2.107-131