Non-performing loans (NPLs), liquidity creation, and moral hazard: Case of Chinese banks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Non-performing loans (NPLs), liquidity creation, and moral hazard: Case of Chinese banks
Background: This study analyzes the impact of non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank liquidity creation to investigate the existence of moral hazard problem in Chinese banks. Methods: It uses data from 197 listed and unlisted Chinese banks, spanning the period 2005 to 2014. Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, fixed and random effect model, and pool data techniques have been used for an...
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This study examines the productivity growth of the nationwide banks of China over the ten years to 2006. Using a bootstrap method for the Malmquist index estimates of productivity growth are constructed with appropriate confidence intervals. The paper adjusts for the quality of the output by accounting for the non-performing loans on the balance sheets and test for the robustness of the results...
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considering significant influence of financial crisis on the economy as a whole, policymakers spend remarkable resources on supervision and methods to ensure about sustainable financial system . a non-performing loan, or npl, is a loan that is in default or close to being in default. many loans become non-performing after being in default for 90 days, but this can depend on the contract termsan...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: China Finance and Economic Review
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2196-5633
DOI: 10.1186/s40589-016-0034-y