Non-Monotonic-Offers Bargaining Protocol
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
We extend the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating-o¤er bargaining procedure to allow players, prior to each bargaining round, to simultaneously and visibly commit to some share of the pie. If commitment costs are small but increasing in the committed share, then the unique outcome consistent with common belief in future rationality (Perea, 2009), or more restrictively subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1387-2532,1573-7454
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-005-0984-1