Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow’s “independence of irrelevant alternatives” condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (“Condorcet cycles”). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable...
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* We thank József Mala for posing the question of Nash implementability on restricted domains that led to this research. We are very grateful to two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their helpful comments and suggestions. The second author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) through the Bolyai János research fellowship. Summary. W...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0603-4