Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games*

Discounted Repeated Games with General Incomplete Information

We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, and such that the payoffs of the players depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm to find all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and...

Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games

The "perfect Folk Theorem" for discounted repeated games establishes that the sets of Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs are equal in the limit as the discount factor 5 tends to one. We provide conditions under which the two sets coincide before the limit is reached. That is, we show how to compute S_ such that the Nash and perfect equilibrium payoffs of the 8 -discounted game are ide...

Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals

We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was cons...

Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games