Non-competition covenants in acquisition deals

Non-Competition Covenants in Acquision Deals

We study the optimal strategic behaviour of the target of a business acquisition where the acquirer is afraid that the former may returns to the market after the sale, and therefore uses a non-competition covenant which protects her (new) business against the future competition from the target. Yet, as the target can return to the market any time after the covenant expiry date, the value of the...

Bitcoin Covenants

This paper presents an extension to Bitcoin’s script language enabling covenants, a primitive that allows transactions to restrict how the value they transfer is used in the future. Covenants expand the set of financial instruments expressible in Bitcoin, and enable new powerful and novel use cases. We illustrate two novel security constructs built using covenants. The first, vaults, focuses on...

Covenants non-compete agreement: what good are they, anyhow?

The Limits of Competition in Defense Acquisition

The rise of the neoliberal agenda founded on neoclassical economic assumptions over the past thirty years has had a profound influence on the framework used to develop and assess policy effectiveness across all arms of government including defence. As a result the evaluation methods within this framework have tended to been dominated by economic metrics. The weakness associated with using these...

Dynamic Platform Competition in a Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the Online Daily Deals Promotion Industry∗

We empirically study a dynamic platform competition in the online daily deals promotion industry characterized by intense rivalry between two leading promotion sites, Groupon and LivingSocial, that broker between local merchants and local consumers. We find that, for a comparable deal, the incumbent Groupon enjoys a significant advantage in performance measured in the number of coupon sales, wh...