Non-Cash Auction for Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: Contract Theoretical Model With Joint Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

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Non-Cash Auction for Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Contract Theoretical Model with Joint Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), spectrum trading is an efficient way for secondary users (SUs) to achieve dynamic spectrum access and to bring economic benefits for the primary users (PUs). Existing methods requires full payment from SU, which blocked many potential “buyers”, and thus limited the PU’s expected income. To better improve PUs’ revenue from spectrum trading in a CRN, we introdu...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

سال: 2017

ISSN: 0733-8716

DOI: 10.1109/jsac.2017.2672178