Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment

نویسندگان

چکیده

In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject sequence makes his prediction twice: first (“first belief”), after he observes predecessor's prediction; (“posterior private signal. We find that subjects weigh their signal as Bayesian agent would do when confirms belief; they overweight it contradicts belief. This way updating, incompatible with Bayesianism, can be explained by Likelihood Ratio Test Updating (LRTU) model, generalization Maximum rule. It is at odds another family Full Updating. we directly test LRTU model and support for it.

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Updating Ambiguous Beliefs in a Social Learning Experiment

We present a novel experimental design to study social learning in the laboratory. Subjects have to predict the value of a good in a sequential order. We elicit each subject’s belief twice: ...rst (“prior belief”), after he observes his predecessors’ action; second (“posterior belief”), after he observes a private signal on the value of the good. We are therefore able to disentangle social lear...

متن کامل

Non-Bayesian social learning

We develop a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks when the information required for learning a payoff-relevant parameter may not be at the disposal of any single agent. Individuals engage in communication with their neighbors in order to learn from their experiences. However, instead of incorporating the views of their neighbors in a fully Bayesian manner, agents use a simple u...

متن کامل

On Non-Bayesian Social Learning

We study a model of information aggregation and social learning recently proposed by Jadbabaie, Sandroni, and Tahbaz-Salehi, in which individual agents try to learn a correct state of the world by iteratively updating their beliefs using private observations and beliefs of their neighbors. No individual agent’s private signal might be informative enough to reveal the unknown state. As a result,...

متن کامل

A Theory of Non-Bayesian Social Learning∗

This paper studies the behavioral foundations of non-Bayesian models of learning over social networks and develops a taxonomy of conditions for information aggregation in a general framework. As our main behavioral assumption, we postulate that agents follow social learning rules that satisfy “imperfect recall,” according to which they treat the current beliefs of their neighbors as sufficient ...

متن کامل

Non-Cooperativity in Bayesian Social Learning

We describe a Bayesian model for social learning of a random variable in which agents might observe each other over a directed network. The outcomes produced are compared to those from a model in which observations occur randomly over a complete graph. In both cases we observe a nontrivial level of observation which maximizes learning, though individuals have strong incentive to defect from the...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1095-7235', '0022-0531']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105188