منابع مشابه
Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experiments with errors in communication: followers either perfectly observe the leaders’ actions or else they observe nothing. Consistent with the theory, the leaders in our experiments enjoy a greater first-mover advantage when followers observe their actions with higher probability, albeit their advantage is wea...
متن کاملAn integrated approach to change leadership.
Leading change has become one of the essential core competencies of health professionals today. Since 2001, the authors have been the key designers and facilitators of the Dorothy Wylie Nursing Leadership Institute (DMW-NLI). The background, key characteristics and benefits of the DMW-NLI have been described in detail elsewhere (Simpson et al. 2002). One of the Institute's key features is that ...
متن کاملOpening the Implicit Leadership Theories’ Black Box: An Experimental Approach with Conjoint Analysis
Although research on implicit leadership theories (ILTs) has concentrated on determining which attributes define a leadership prototype, little attention has been paid to testing the relative importance of each of these attributes for individuals' leadership perceptions. Building on socio-cognitive theories of impression processes, we experimentally explore the formation of leadership perceptio...
متن کاملRealized Volatility in Noisy Prices: a MSRV approach
Volatility is the primary measure of risk in modern finance and volatility estimation and inference has attracted substantial attention in the recent financial econometric literature, especially in high-frequency analyses. High-frequency prices carry a significant amount of noise. Therefore, there are two volatility components embedded in the returns constructed using high frequency prices: the...
متن کاملPrice Leadership and Firm Size Asymmetry: An Experimental Analysis∗
We use laboratory experiments to examine the effect of firm size asymmetry on price leadership in a capacity constrained duopoly. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our duopoly game predicts that the large firm is the price leader. In the experiment, although price leadership by the large firm is frequently observed, behavior deviates significantly from the model’s prediction. Both small...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.304115