منابع مشابه
No . 34 Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation ?
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In recent years, education policymakers have shown growing interest in the potential of incentive pay for teachers as a way to improve student performance. Champions of this approach contend that incentive pay based on student performance can motivate teachers to improve their teaching practices, which in turn will boost student achievement; in addition, over the longer term, rewarding quality ...
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Personalization under Privacy Concerns Ramnath K. Chellappa* [email protected] Shivendu Shivendu [email protected] * 1300 Clifton Road, Goizueta Business School, Emory University Atlanta, GA 30322-2710 Abstract Online personalization services belong to a class of economic goods with “no-freedisposal” (NFD) property, where due to privacy concerns more services is not always preferr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Vital
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1741-7503,1741-7511
DOI: 10.1038/vital1541