No Holdup in Dynamic Markets

نویسندگان
چکیده

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Article history: Received 15 June 2015 Available online 21 March 2017 JEL classification: C78 D40

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal

سال: 2018

ISSN: 1556-5068

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3218411