No excuses for moral realism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moral Realism, Skepticism and Anti-realism: a Critical Analysis of the Criteria for Moral Realism
Despite the fact that realism has long been the dominant outlook in science, ethical realism has been thought to be especially problematic. Even the most steadfast realists in other fields have questioned the existence of moral truths. It seems that the would be moral realist has his work cut out for him. The first step necessary for any defense of moral realism will be the identification of th...
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Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is sup...
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It is sometimes claimed that if moral realism is true, then rational and informed individuals would not disagree about morality. According to this line of thought, the moral realist is committed to an extremely substantive convergence thesis, one that might very well turn out to be false. Although this idea has been accepted by prominent moral realists as well as by antirealists, I argue that w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophical Studies
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0031-8116,1573-0883
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-017-0882-9