Nixon and Ford as ex-post Keynesians

Ex - ante and ex - post strong correlated

A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy pro le that is immune to joint deviations. Di erent notions of strong correlated equilibria were de ned in the literature. One major di erence among those de nitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated pro le. In this paper we prov...

Intentions and Ex-Post Implementation∗

Intention-based reciprocity is an important motivation for human behavior, and it can be exploited in the design of economic allocation mechanisms. In this paper, we address questions of robustness that arise in the context of asymmetric information about intentions. We propose allocation mechanisms that eliminate uncertainty about the players’ intentions, by making all types of each player equ...

Flipping and ex post aggregation

We show that Bayesian ex post aggregation is unstable with respect to refinements. Suppose a group of Bayesians use ex post aggregation. Since it is a joint problem, each agent’s problem is captured by the same model, but probabilities and utilities may vary. If they analyze the same situation in more detail, their refined analysis should preserve their preferences among acts. However, ex post ...

John Alexander Nixon

Ex post implementation

We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and in economic environments su¢ cient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is su¢ cient. Ex post monotonicity is satis…ed in all single crossing environments with stric...