New Technologies, Wages, and Worker Selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Seniority rules , worker mobility and wages
We construct a multi-country employer-employee data to examine the consequences of employment protection. We identify the effects by comparing worker exit rates between units of the same firm that operate in two countries that have different seniority rules. The results show that last-in-first-out rules reduce dismissals of older, more senior workers, especially in shrinking multinational firms...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Labor Economics
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0734-306X,1537-5307
DOI: 10.1086/209928