New Perspectives on May’s Theorem and the Median Voter Theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
The paper defines and analyzes May’s Theorem the Median Voter from Public Policy Choice literature seeks to compare contrast use of both. Through theoretical applied examples, demonstrates how collective decision-making research has evolved better inform public policy. Building on Black’s (1948) notion that it is voter in ideological middle decides elections, Holcombe (1980) provides an empirical analysis this theory, Scervini (2012) attempts show class (median) taxation redistribution policy, Rowley (1984) takes a New Institutional approach analyzing voters’ preferences, Groot van der Linde (2016) conducts cross-country see if holds true across time cultures, Carrillo Castanheira (2008) voters change their behavior preference median as press reveals new information about quality candidates which alters perceptions, Congleton (2003) asserts there may not always be with examples. voting aggregation Hotelling (1929), Black (1948), Maskin (1999), Duggan (2015), Brady Chambers (2017) expand social theory showing Arrow (1951) May (1952)’s work needed updated include verifiable, tests further refinements. shows policy group decision making application have over past 75 years shines some light areas for future analysis. These findings are important because will help make proposals more palatable (median voter) who, studies show, often determines winner. interest anyone involved processes.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Financial markets, institutions and risks
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2521-1242', '2521-1250']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21272/fmir.6(1).40-45.2022