منابع مشابه
Compliance with International Agreements
The study of compliance with international agreements has gained momentum over the past few years. Since the conclusion of World War II, this research agenda had been marginalized by the predominance of realist approaches to the study of international relations. However, alternative perspectives have developed that suggest that international law and institutions are important influences on the ...
متن کاملInternational Fisheries Agreements with a Shifting Stock
When a fish stock shifts from one nation to another nation, e.g. due to climate change, the nation that loses the resource has incentives to deplete it while the other nation, receiving the resource, has incentives to conserve it. We propose an analytical model to study under which circumstances self-enforcing agreements can align incentives. Our setup allows to distinguish between a fast and a...
متن کاملIssues of Fairness in International Trade Agreements
In this paper, we first describe the characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are the basis of the framework of the multilateral trading system. We then provide an overview of concepts of fairness in trade agreements. Thereafter, we offer a critique of the efficiency criterion in assessing multilateral trade agreements, taking issue with T.N. Srinivasan’s (2006) analysis and t...
متن کاملInternational Institutions and Compliance with Agreements
The ultimate litmus test of compliance theories occurs in situations where states’ interests are directly opposed, such as competing interstate claims over territory, maritime areas, and cross-border rivers. This article considers the extent to which the involvement of international institutions in the settlement of contentious issues between states bolsters compliance with agreements that are ...
متن کاملInternational Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems
We study coalition formation and the strategic timing of membership of an IEA for environmental issues in the Coalitional Bargaining Game (CBG) of Gomes (2005, Econometrica). For the general CBG, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition for immediate formation of the grand coalition. We apply the CBG to a river sharing problem with two symmetric upstream agents and one downstream agent....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Farm Economics
سال: 1943
ISSN: 1071-1031
DOI: 10.2307/1231914