Neural basis of moral verdict and moral deliberation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Neural basis of moral verdict and moral deliberation.
How people judge something to be morally right or wrong is a fundamental question of both the sciences and the humanities. Here we aim to identify the neural processes that underlie the specific conclusion that something is morally wrong. To do this, we introduce a novel distinction between "moral deliberation," or the weighing of moral considerations, and the formation of a "moral verdict," or...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Neuroscience
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1747-0919,1747-0927
DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2011.559363