Network interconnection with competitive transit
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Network interconnection with competitive transit
We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two local exchange carriers (LECs)) and a third network (e.g., an interexchange carrier (IXC)) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC s network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Information Economics and Policy
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0167-6245
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.009