Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games

نویسندگان

چکیده

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In symmetric evolutionary games with continuous strategy spaces, Cressman [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="b6">6</xref>] has proved an interesting stability result for the associated replicator dynamics relating concepts of neighborhood superiority and attracting polymorphic states respect to weak topology. Similar results are also established monomorphic profiles in 2-player asymmetric rid="b8">8</xref>]. In present paper, we use model introduced by Mendoza-Palacios Hernández-Lerma rid="b17">17</xref>] obtain a <inline-formula><tex-math id="M1">\begin{document}$ n $\end{document}</tex-math></inline-formula>-player action spaces using concept strong (Definition 2.3). particular, prove that superior attracting. It is shown profile fact vector Dirac measures. Moreover, establish notion does not imply uninvadability vice-versa.</p>

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of dynamics and games

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['2164-6066', '2164-6074']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022012