Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
This note presents a counter-example to Theorems 3 and 4 in Peters [3].
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.006