Negligence, Causation, and Incentives for Care

Negligence, Causation, and Incentives for Care

We present a new model of negligence and causation and examine the influence of the causation test on the level of care under negligence. In this model, the injurer’s decision to take care reduces the likelihood of an accident only in the event that some nondeterministic intervention occurs. The effects of the causation test depend on the information available to the court, and the manner in wh...

Imperfect Observability and Incentive for Care under the Negligence Rule

This paper studies an economic model of the Negligence rule and considers litigation between a defendant and a plaintiff, under the assumption that the plaintiff may not perfectly observe the defendant’s action ex post. We consider the noiseless case as a benchmark that the plaintiff perfectly observes the defendant action ex post. We show in the noiseless case that the defendant surely takes c...

Economic incentives for preventive care.

Authors' conclusions Definitions for neither 'prevention' nor 'economic incentive' are specifically addressed in the literature. Research on the effects of incentive interventions on preventive care and health promotion appears to be driven by policy considerations. Definitions for preventive care and economic incentives are not emphasized in the literature, not only in terms of locating the in...

"Handle life with care: prevent violence and negligence".

Quality of care and negligence litigation in nursing homes.

BACKGROUND It is unclear whether high-quality health care institutions are less likely to be sued for negligence than their low-performing counterparts. METHODS We linked information on tort claims brought against 1465 nursing homes between 1998 and 2006 to 10 indicators of nursing home quality drawn from two U.S. national data sets: the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting system and ...