Negative externalities of government
نویسندگان
چکیده
The neoclassical economists have long used the concept of «market failure» as a stick with which to beat up on free enterprise system. Foremost amongst these so called failures» are «negative externalities.» These defined action that negatively affects third parties, other than via price. key example is pollution. dismal scientists never mention, however, fact government itself source negative externalities itself, particularly through socialization risk; e.g., social security, Medicare, Medicaid and forms socialized medicine, unemployment insurance, welfare, etc. present paper devoted explicating elaborating upon failure.
 Key words: Externality, public good, market failure, neighborhood effect, moral hazard.
 JEL Classification: Q5; D62; H41.
 Resumen: Los economistas neoclásicos han utilizado durante mucho tiempo el concepto de «fallo mercado» como un bastón con que golpear sobre sistema libre empresa. Principalmente entre los llamados «fallos se encuentran las «externalidades negativas». Estas definen acciones afectan negativamente terceras partes por vías distintas precios. El ejemplo clave es la polución. Sin embargo, estos «tristes» científicos nunca mencionan hecho propio gobierno fuente propias externalidades negativas, particularmente través socialización del riesgo; ejemplo, seguridad social, seguros médicos estatales, enfermedad, desempleo, asistencia presente trabajo dedica explicar y ampliar fallo gobierno.
 Palabras clave: Externalidad, bien público, mercado, efecto vecindario, gobierno, riesgo moral.
 Clasificación JEL: H41.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Procesos de mercado
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1697-6797']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v7i1.285