Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation
We model externality abatement as an implementation problem. A social planner would like to ensure efficient behavior among a group of agents whose actions are sources of externalities. However, the planner has limited information about the agents' preferences, and he is unable to distinguish individual agents except through their action choices. We prove that if a concavity condition on aggreg...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1467-937X,0034-6527
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2005.00355.x