Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence
Normal form games are nearly compact and continuous (NCC) if they can be understood as games played on strategy spaces that are dense subsets of the strategy spaces of larger compact games with jointly continuous payoffs. There are intrinsic algebraic, measure theoretic, functional analysis, and finite approximability characterizations of NCC games. NCC games have finitely additive equilibria, ...
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We de ̄ne Random Belief Equilibrium (RBE) in ̄nite, normal form games. We assume that a player's beliefs about the strategy choices of others are randomly drawn from a belief distribution. This distribution is dispersed around a central strategy pro ̄le, the focus. At an RBE: (1) Each player chooses a best response relative to her drawn beliefs. (2) The expected choice of each player coincides wi...
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Infinite normal form games that are mathematically simple have been treated [ Harris, C.J., Stinchcombe, M.B., Zame, W.R., in press. Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence. Games Econ. Behav.]. Under study in this paper are the other infinite normal form games, a class that includes the normal forms of most extensive form games with infinite...
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If the preferences of the players in a strategic game satisfy certain continuity conditions, then the acyclicity of individual improvements implies the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium. Moreover, starting from any strategy profile, an arbitrary neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria can be reached after a finite number of individual improvements. JEL Classification Number: C 72.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.008