Naturalness is Not an Aim of Belief
نویسندگان
چکیده
Recently some philosophers have defended the thesis that naturalness, or joint-carvingness, is an aim of belief. This paper argues there important class counterexamples to this thesis. In particular, it argued naturalness not our beliefs concerning what joint carving and not.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Erkenntnis
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0165-0106', '1572-8420']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00452-3