Naturalizing the contributory

Abstract This paper has two aims. First, I critically discuss Daniel Whiting’s (Philos Stud 195(9):2191–2208, 2018) recent proposal that a reason to ϕ is evidence of respect in which it right ϕ. raise objections against this view: (i) subject modified version Eva Schmidt’s (Ethics 127(3):708–718, counterexample the influential account reasons terms and ‘ought’, and—setting aside judgments about specific cases—, (ii) also an important sense uninformative . Interestingly, turns out last objection cannot be helpfully understood circularity. leads more general question criteria adequacy for reductive accounts reasons: In what sense, if any, should such informative? The second aim clarify one suggested by reflection on proposal. particular, argue successful naturalize contributory— mean, roughly, they explain specifically contributory nature fully non-normative terms. Moreover, how views fail criterion are unable meet certain key explanatory desiderata reasons. After broaching some wider implications project understanding notion other terms, conclude naturalizing helpful structuring debate over