National Injustice, Caring Institutions and Cosmopolitan Motivation

Work motivation , institutions , and performance

In this paper we study experimentally four remedies to overcome inefficiencies that arise from the incompleteness of contracts. These remedies are reciprocity, repeated game effects, social embeddedness, and incentive contracts. In our baseline treatment we find that reciprocity is a powerful contract enforcement device. A second experiment establishes that repeated game effects interact with r...

Co-national Obligations & Cosmopolitan Obligations towards Foreigners

1143 National and Sub - national Policies and Institutions 15

Contributing Authors: Arild Angelsen (Norway), Kazumasu Aoki (Japan), Kenji Asano (Japan), Michele Betsill (USA), Rishikesh Ram Bhandary (Nepal / USA), Nils-Axel Braathen (France / Norway), Harriet Bulkeley (UK), Dallas Burtraw (USA), Ann Carlson (USA), Luis Gomez-Echeverri (Austria / Colombia), Erik Haites (Canada), Frank Jotzo (Germany / Australia), Milind Kandlikar (India / Canada), Osamu Ki...

Work motivation , institutions , and performance Simon Gächter and Armin Falk

In this paper we study experimentally four remedies to overcome inefficiencies that arise from the incompleteness of contracts. These remedies are reciprocity, repeated game effects, social embeddedness, and incentive contracts. In our baseline treatment we find that reciprocity is a powerful contract enforcement device. A second experiment establishes that repeated game effects interact with r...

National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa.

We investigate the role of national institutions on subnational African development in a novel framework that accounts for both local geography and cultural-genetic traits. We exploit the fact that the political boundaries on the eve of African independence partitioned more than 200 ethnic groups across adjacent countries subjecting similar cultures, residing in homogeneous geographic areas, to...