Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms
Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. De ne a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When preferences over alternatives are strict, we show that Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999) is both necessary and su¢ cient for a social choi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0158-3