Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
Hyperfunctions are social choice rules which assign sets of alternatives to preference profiles over sets. So, they are more general objects compared to standard (social choice) correspondences. Thus every correspondence can be expressed in terms of an equivalent hyperfunction. We postulate the equivalence between implementing a correspondence and its equivalent hyperfunction. We give a partial...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1434-4742,1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0117-7