Nash equilibria in N-person games without convexity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Distribution of pure Nash equilibria in n-person games with random best responses
In this paper we study the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite n-player games. A distinguishing feature of our study is that we allow general potentially multivalued best reply corresponsences. Given the number K of pure strategies to each player, we assign to each player a distribution over the number of his pure best replies against each strategy profile of his opponents. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Mathematics Letters
سال: 1992
ISSN: 0893-9659
DOI: 10.1016/0893-9659(92)90067-j