منابع مشابه
Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set*
We extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a characterization of the Nash set of NTU games, defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from t...
متن کاملNash Bargaining with the Option to Wait*
This paper derives the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for two-player games where each player has the option of postponing bargaining till a future period. This option endogenously determines the threat points of the initial game. The outcome is compared with the case where there is no such option, and with the usual Rubinstein bargaining game where one offer per period is made. JEL Classi...
متن کاملThe Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution∗
The coalitional Nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the Nash product is maximal. We consider a non-cooperative model in which one team may form. The grand team, consisting of all players, generates the largest surplus. But a smaller team may form. We show that as players get more patient if an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists, it must deliver payof...
متن کاملPure Strategy Nash Bargaining Solutions
A broad class of 2-person threat games for which a unique pure strategy Nash bargaining solution exists is characterized in terms of three, simple, empirically meaningful restrictions on the joint objective function: compact domain, continuity, and "corner concavity." Connectedness [in particular, convexity] of the strategy and payoff sets is not required. In addition, conditions are given for ...
متن کاملMonotone bargaining is Nash-solvable
Given two finite ordered sets A = {a1, . . . , am} and B = {b1, . . . , bn}, introduce the set of mn outcomes of the game O = {(a, b) | a ∈ A, b ∈ B} = {(ai, bj) | i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ J = {1, . . . , n}. Two players, Alice and Bob, have the sets of strategies X and Y that consist of all monotone non-decreasing mappings x : A → B and y : B → A, respectively. It is easily seen that each pa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00224-3