Naked Exclusion with Private Offers

Can Naked Exclusion Be Procompetitive?

Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that case an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive c...

Naked Exclusion and the Anticompetitive Accommodation of Entry: Two Examples

In this appendix, specific results for the linear demand specification and Hotelling specification are established, corresponding to the paper: “Naked Exclusion and the Anticompetitive Accommodation of Entry” 1 Representative consumer (linear demand) Consider the standard exogenous differentiation model with linear demands, with consumers’ utility from the two products defined as U (q1, q2) = α...

Naked Exclusion and the Anticompetitive Accommodation of Entry

We model exclusive dealing when the incumbent and potential entrant offer differentiated products and buyers are downstream firms. While the resulting exclusive dealing is always anticompetitive, it does not necessarily involve foreclosure.

Naked Exclusion in the Lab: the Case of Sequential Contracting*

In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley [1991] and Segal and Whinston [2000b], we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it is cheaper for the incumbent than simultaneous contracting. We find that an incumbent who proposes contracts to buyers sequentially, excludes significantly more often than an incumbe...

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