Mumford–Shah Model for One-to-One Edge Matching
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mumford-Shah Model for One-to-One Edge Matching
This paper presents a new algorithm based on the Mumford-Shah model for simultaneously detecting the edge features of two images and jointly estimating a consistent set of transformations to match them. Compared to the current asymmetric methods in the literature, this fully symmetric method allows one to determine one-to-one correspondences between the edge features of two images. The entire v...
متن کاملDominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dominance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (indirect) agents could be very different. In this paper, we characterize dominance inv...
متن کاملApproximate one-to-one point pattern matching
Given a set A ={a1, . . . ,an} of n image points and a set B ={b1, . . . ,bn} of n model points,the problem is to find a transformation matching (a one-to-one mapping) each point a ∈ A tosome point b ∈ B such that the length of the longest edge in the matching is minimized (so-calledbottleneck distance). The geometric transformations we allow are translation, rot...
متن کاملComparative static and computational methods for an empirical one-to-one transferable utility matching model
I show that the equilibrium distribution of matches associated with the empirical transferable utility (TU) one-to-one matching model introduced by Choo and Siow (2006a,b) corresponds to the fixed point of system of K + L nonlinear equations; with K and L respectively equal to the number of discrete types of women and men. I use this representation to derive new comparative static results, show...
متن کاملSequential Entry in One-to-one Matching Markets
We study in one-to-one matching markets a process of sequential entry, in which participants enter in the market one at a time, in some arbitrary given order. We identify a large family of orders (optimal orders) which converge to the optimal stable matching.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Image Processing
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1057-7149
DOI: 10.1109/tip.2007.906277