Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
Cheap talk games have been widely used to analyze situations in which a policy maker needs expert advice. In previous work, agent uncertainty has almost always been modeled using a single-dimensional state variable. In this paper we prove that the dimensionality of the uncertain variable has an important qualitative impact on results and yields interesting insights into the \mechanics" of infor...
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In this paper we extend the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to a multidimensional state space and policy space. We provide a characterization of equilibria. We focus on the question of feasibility of information transmission, for large degrees of conflict of interests between the sender and the receiver. We show that it is possible to construct equilibria with information transmis...
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In this paper, we consider a two-dimensional cheap-talk game with two senders and one receiver. The senders possess the same information and sequentially send messages about that information. In one-dimensional sequential message cheap-talk games where the state space is unbounded, the information is fully transmitted under the self-serving belief, which is suggested by Krishna and Morgan (2001...
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At the end of the experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of NT$100 plus the NTD converted from the “Standard Currency Units” you have earned in the experiment. (“Standard Currency Units” are the experimental currency units used in the experiment.) The amount of “Standard Currency Units” you will receive, which will be different for each participant, depends on your decision, the decision of...
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We consider a cheap-talk setting that mimics the situation where an incumbent firm (the sender) is endowed with incentives to understate the true size of the market demand to two potential entrants (the receivers). Although our experimental data reveals that senders’ messages convey truthful information and this is picked up by the receivers, this overcommunication (relative to standard theoret...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00336