Multiple bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ascending Auctions for Bidders with Complex Valuations
The last decade has seen a surprisingly rich interplay between economics, computer science, and game theory. From the economics side, the emergence of the Internet as a central platform to conduct trade has created new types of markets, mainly one-sided auction markets. These electronic markets share many properties with the more classical auction types, on the one hand, but also exhibit severa...
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We exploit a unique feature of data from Canadian treasury bill auctions, in which some bidders have information about rivals’ bids, to develop a test if values are private. Information about a rival’s bid causes a bidder to bid differently when she has a private value than when her value depends on rivals’ information. In a divisible good setting, such as treasury bill auctions, bidders with p...
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A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object ...
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The objects for sale in most auctions display both private and common value characteristics. This salient feature of many real-world auctions has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behavior. This paper reports such an analysis in the context of a stylized model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.002