MULTILATERAL TRADE BARGAINING AND DOMINANT STRATEGIES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining Delay in Multilateral Trade Negotiations
This paper theoretically and empirically explores bargaining delay in tariff negotiations. By imposing a bargaining structure in an equilibrium trade framework, I derive many testable predictions of delay. I then take my model to the newly compiled GATT (Torquay) tariff negotiation data, which includes detailed (product-level) information of the timing and contents of countries’ (back-and-forth...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0020-6598
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12320