منابع مشابه
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In the context of virtual machines live migration, two strategies called “pre-copy” and “post-copy” have already been presented; but each of these strategies works well only in some circumstances. In this paper, we have a brief presentation of QAVNS and then introduce a new approach which is based on the concept of "informational object", assigning QAVNS-scheme-revision number, and observing th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Development Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0304-3878
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.12.001