Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We consider a demand game with the following additional ingredients: (i) there is an exogenous deadline, by which bargaining has to end; (ii) prior to the deadline, players may sequentially change their demands as often as they like; (iii) changing one’s demand is costly, and this cost increases as the deadline gets ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.001