Multidimensional private information, market structure, and insurance markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Markets with Multidimensional Private Information
Impose Assumption 1 and assume there exists a β ∈ B with βΓ(v) > v. The semi-separating equilibrium is characterized by a discount factor for the marginal buyer, β̂ ∈ B, which is determined in equation (A1) below. For now, fix β̂ and assume, as we verify below, that β̂Γ(v) > v. We next define two critical prices. The lowest price with trade is p ≡ β̂Γ(v), the value that the marginal buyer places on...
متن کاملand Zenan Wu Multidimensional Private Information , Market
A large empirical literature found that the correlation between insurance purchase and ex post realization of risk is often statistically insignificant or negative. This is inconsistent with the predictions from the classic models of insurance a la Akerlof (1970), Pauly (1974) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) where consumers have one-dimensional heterogeneity in their risk types. It is sugges...
متن کاملPrivate Information and Insurance Rejections.
Across a wide set of non-group insurance markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. This paper argues that private information, held by the potential applicant pool, explains rejections. I formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk. I first derive a new no-trade result that ...
متن کاملEssays on Private Medicare Insurance Markets
This dissertation consists of two essays in economics of industrial organization on private Medicare insurance markets. In the first chapter, together with Naoki Aizawa, we study the incentives for private health insurers to use advertising to attract healthy individuals in the market for private Medicare plans called Medicare Advantage (MA). Using data on the advertising expenditures of MA pla...
متن کاملA simple test for private information in insurance markets with heterogeneous insurance demand
A positive correlation between insurance coverage and ex post risk indicates private information in insurance markets. However, this test fails if agents have heterogeneous risk attitudes. We propose a finitemixturemodel that conditions on unobserved typeswho differ in their risks preferences and detects asymmetric information even if heterogeneous risk attitudes exist. Our method identifies th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0741-6261,1756-2171
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12251