Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social Welfare Maximization in Dynamic Strategic Decision Problems
Deriving effective group decision-making procedures for complex environments is hard but of fundamental importance, and the challenges grow significantly more daunting when individuals are self-interested. There is an inherent tension in striving to achieve social goals in decisions that will impact individuals who are only concerned with selfish objectives. Innumerable scenarios fit this mold,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383
DOI: 10.1145/3381527