Multiagent Reniforcement Learning in Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) investigate a stochastic evolutionary model for extensive form games and show that even for games of perfect information with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, non-subgame perfect equilibrium-strategies may well survive in the long run even when mutation rates tend to zero. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of these games Hart (2002) sho...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Sciences
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1812-5654
DOI: 10.3923/jas.2009.2056.2066