منابع مشابه
Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show that computing the winner for proportional approval voting is NP-hard, closing a long standing open problem. As none of the rules are strategyproof, even for d...
متن کاملMonotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules
In this paper we study several monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules. We consider monotonicity with respect to the support received by the winners and also monotonicity in the size of the committee. Monotonicity with respect to the support is studied when the set of voters does not change and when new voters enter the election. For each of these two cases we consider a...
متن کاملWinner Determination in Sequential Majority Voting
Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform a sequence of pairwise majority comparisons between two candidates. The winner thus depends on the chosen sequence of comparisons, which can be represented by a binary tree. We address the difficulty of computing candidates that win for some trees, and then introduce and study the notion of fair...
متن کاملWhat Do We Elect Committees For? A Voting Committee Model for Multi-Winner Rules
We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of ballots to make final decisions regarding various issues. The satisfaction of voters comes from the final decisions made by the elected committee. Our results s...
متن کاملStrategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed number of candidates are to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants; the candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded. Best responses involve votin...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Estudios de Economía Aplicada
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1697-5731,1133-3197
DOI: 10.25115/eea.v36i1.2522