Multi-tasking and inequity aversion in the linear–exponential–normal moral hazard model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multi-Tasking and Inequity Aversion in the Linear-Exponential-Normal Moral Hazard Model
This paper analyzes the impact of wage comparisons among inequity-averse agents on optimal incentive intensities in a linear–exponential–normal moral hazard model with multi-tasking. We consider individual and team production tasks that differ in that only individual production causes wage inequality. If the tasks are substitutes in the agents’ effort cost functions, the principal might want to...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.010