Multi-Player Stopping Games in Continuous Time
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stopping Games in Continuous Time
We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing literature, we do not assume any conditions on the relations between the payoff processes. We also show that both players have simple ε-optimal randomized stopp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2660021