Multi-period bargaining: asymmetric information and risk aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multi-Period Bargaining: Asymmetric Information and Risk Aversion
A two period bargaining model with asymmetric information is considered. An uninformed seller charges a uniform price to two buyers. A risk averse seller offers a larger price cut in period two when one buyer remains in the market than when two buyers remain. The price in period one is sensitive to the number of buyers and the seller’s degree of risk aversion. The initial price charged to a sin...
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We study a dynamic competitive equilibrium model with asymmetric information about time-variant aggregate risk aversion. We show that there still exists a linear price function in out model, a nice result in the other asymmetric information competitive equilibrium models. Furthermore, we show that in our model, asymmetric information play a role in the long run risk premium. When the proportion...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00452-9