Motivational internalism and folk intuitions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Folk intuitions about consciousness
In science and philosophy, there is still no general agreement on what ‘consciousness’ is. But how do normal people (with no education in psychology or philosophy) use the term in their everyday life? What is the folk understanding of the word “conscious”? We conducted an online study on how the general public uses the word “consciousness” in their daily life. Participants (n=445) answered the ...
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Perhaps some day, we will find experimental data that deflates the philosophical presumption in favor of the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. Unfortunately, that day is not today. Brian Talbot is right that data derived from commonsense psychology are unlikely to close the explanatory gap. More specifically, he is right that we must carefully investigate the source of commonsense judgments befo...
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The dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists must be one of the most persistent and heated deadlocks in Western philosophy. Incompatibilists maintain that people are not fully morally responsible if determinism is true, i.e., if every event is an inevitable consequence of the prior conditions and the natural laws. By contrast, compatibilists maintain that even if determinism is true ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophical Psychology
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0951-5089,1465-394X
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2014.894431