More Than a Score: Interest Group Ratings and Polarized Politics

A Network Approach to Interest Group Politics

A Model of Inequality and Interest Group Politics*

In this paper we build a model to examine inequality of process and inequality of outcomes in interest group politics. The model has the following features: (i) interest groups which compete for rents in a noncooperative game, (ii) a self-interested rent-setting political decision maker (iii) democratic or popular pressure as a check on the self-interest of the political decision maker. We allo...

Quasi Score is more efficient than Corrected Score in a general nonlinear measurement error model

We compare two consistent estimators of the parameter vector β of a general exponential family measurement error model with respect to their relative efficiency. The quasi score (QS) estimator uses the distribution of the regressor, the corrected score (CS) estimator does not make use of this distribution and is therefore more robust. However, if the regressor distribution is known, QS is asymp...

Conflicts of interest in dermatology: more than skin deep?

Quasi Score is more efficient than Corrected Score in a polynomial measurement error model

We consider a polynomial regression model, where the covariate is measured with Gaussian errors. The measurement error variance is supposed to be known. The covariate is normally distributed with known mean and variance. Quasi Score (QS) and Corrected Score (CS) are two consistent estimation methods, where the first makes use of the distribution of the covariate (structural method), while the l...