More on "Ought" Implies "Can" and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and the principle of alternate possibilities

In his paper ‘What we are morally responsible for’,1 Harry Frankfurt claims, in passing, that while the ‘Frankfurt Counterexamples’2 are counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP: An agent is morally blameworthy3 for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise), they are not counterexamples to the famous Kantian maxim that ‘Ought’ implies ‘Can’. In an Analysis...

More on “Ought” Implies “Can” and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

Revising the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). The paper first describes the principle as articulated by A.J. Ayer. Subsequently, the paper examines Frankfurt’s critique and proposed revision of the principle and argues that Frankfurt’s proposal relies on an excessively simplistic account of practical reasoning, wh...

Internal Reasons and the Ought-implies-can Principle1

The task of this essay is to use the ought-implies-can principle (OIC) to clarify and defend Bernard Williams’ claim that all reasons are internal. On the interpretation offered here, the internalism/externalism controversy initiated by Williams is about the indexicality of normative practical reasons. The central question is this: Are all of our reasons anchored to our current beliefs and desi...

“Ought implies Can”: secondary and higher-order interpretations

In this paper we will investigate the “Ought implies Can” (OIC) thesis. We will concentrate on explanations and interpretations of OIC, clarifying its uses and relevance. The OIC thesis is relevant to debates that ranges from semantics and pragmatics to legal philosophy, deontic logic and the philosophy of action and mind. We state the different theses that have been proposed concerning OIC and...