MORAL REALISM AND EXPERT DISAGREEMENT

Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness

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D. Loeb Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement

The argument from disagreement is among the most important that has been directed against moral realism.1 Yet, in recent years it has been widely rejected – so widely, in fact, that even those who are sympathetic with irrealism have often found it unconvincing. One reason for this has to do with the fact that newer, more sophisticated versions of moral realism have recently emerged. Some of the...

How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?

Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. In this paper I attempt to understand how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical realism. I do this by going through several distinct (though often related) arguments from disagreement, carefully distinguishing between them, and critically evaluating their merits. ...

Expert Judgement and Expert Disagreement

As Hammond has argued, traditional explanations for disagreement among experts (incompetence, venality, and ideology) are inadequate. The character and fallibilities of the human judgement process itself lead to persistent disagreements even among competent, honest, and disinterested experts. Social Judgement Theory provides powerful methods for analysing such judgementally based disagreements ...

Agency and Moral Realism